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The article integrates several theoretical and practical is-
sues into the general context of the contemporary crisis of 
the bureaucratic state and a quest for new patterns of gov-
ernance. Considering the paradox of the positive influence 
of social distrust on political development, the dependence 
between trust and corruption, and recent changes in the 
public management of several leading countries as a kind 
of administrative response to new situations in the con-
temporary world, the author devotes the main part of the 
article to the case of Russia. Several rounds of unsuccessful 
efforts to create a genuine public service in post-Soviet Rus-
sia are described and the reasons for failure are explored. 
The common denominator of the author’s approach is an 
appraisal of the current condition of bureaucratic state in-
stitutions and personnel as unsuited to contemporary pub-
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lic expectations and demands, and the vital need to make 
them much more responsive and cooperative. 
Keywords: governance, public service reforms, public trust, 
Russia
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to consider several acute problems of polit-
ical and administrative theory and practice at a time of a general crisis 
of the bureaucratic state: the current decline of public trust in executive 
institutions and persons in power, the paradox of the positive influence 
of public political distrust on political development, the dependence be-
tween trust and corruption, and the attempts of administrative science in 
several countries to find a new pattern of relationships between state and 
civil society. Combining these initial prerequisites in a single approach, 
the author devotes the major part of the paper to the case of Russia; i.e., 
he provides a detailed description of the several rounds of efforts to create 
a genuine public service in post-Soviet Russia and analyses the reasons for 
their dramatic failures and disappointments. 
2. The Issue of the Decline of Public Trust 
1.1. Phenomenon and Reasons for Decline 
Modern governments face new changes, one of which is most certainly the 
decline of trust in public institutions, public officials, and politicians. The 
massive and ever-larger street demonstrations and protests in over a hun-
dred Russian towns and cities in the spring and summer of 2017 were a re-
action to corruptive abuses of power, and serve as a remarkable example of 
both public political awakening and the inability of the authorities to meet 
the new challenge adequately. The authorities’ reaction to these events is 
a mixture of fear, brutality, and lack of understanding of what is going on. 
Ordinary people are becoming increasingly convinced that those in power 
have other priorities than to serve the public and are ready to oppose them 
in different ways, even at the risk of being arrested. As recently witnessed 
during the events in the centre of Moscow on Russia Day – a national hol-
iday observed on June 12– and several times previously, during the spring 
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months, most of the young people in the crowd overcame their natural 
physical fear and were psychologically ready to be detained and exposed to 
administrative arrests. The clumsy efforts of the authorities to both fright-
en youth by the brutal actions of detachments of special guards and to 
distract them by different means of entertainment were unsuccessful and 
counterproductive in some way. This is not exclusively a Russian issue. 
Similar waves of “occupy” and other protest movements could be observed 
in many countries in the period 2011–2017, from the USA to Ukraine, and 
from the Arabic region to Iran and Hong Kong. It may be said that a rather 
serious alienation of the people from the state is underway.
It is important to note that the leaders of street protests are well-educated 
and personally successful young people. Because they are better educated 
and informed, they understand their human and political rights better 
and see the possible threats clearly. As a result, they treat governments 
and public services more critically. Public expectations have grown and 
demands addressed at governments have multiplied, and because these 
demands are not being fulfilled, the level of dissatisfaction has increased. 
The inability of governments to effectively manage painful social prob-
lems and to meet the challenges of the new age is becoming obvious to 
the public and causes people to distrust the bureaucratic system as such. 
Altogether, it is possible to speak about a general crisis of the bureaucrat-
ic state model in general, at least in its traditional forms.
The reactions of different governments to this situation range from rhe-
torical complaints of how “it is difficult to govern in an anti-government 
era” to real, serious efforts to reform the civil service and other public in-
stitutions. Some scholars claim that this is just a part of the story; i.e., the 
necessary rejectionist step in constructing a new governance paradigm (s. 
for example Barabashev, 2016). 
The events of the last 40 years, especially the horrible atrocities of those 
in power in totalitarian and authoritarian states in the 20th century have 
taught the citizens to be suspicious, or at least cautious, of their govern-
ments’ ambitions and expansion. As a result, the civic “desacralisation” of 
the state, even in countries with a long-term statist and paternalistic tra-
dition like Russia, has become an empirical fact. It may be considered 
one of the major intellectual achievements of the second half of the 20th 
century and may be interpreted as a reincarnation of the liberal concept 
of the role and place of the state in public life.
In the field of public administration this shift has resulted, in particular, 
in a move from the state providing public services directly to assuming a 
572


















coordinating and monitoring role in providing public goods. This move-
ment originated against the background of the New Public Management 
reforms and even acquired the name of “managerial revolution”. The USA 
and the UK were the pioneers and leaders of this process. In the US 
it was launched in the first half of the 1990s in the form of a program 
called Reinventing Government. However, the program faced some political 
obstacles and was only partially realised, bringing about negative effects 
and disappointment. Another, more successful, example was the almost 
unprecedented reform of the Civil Service Commission in Britain. The 
continental European countries took only a few more modest steps in 
a similar direction (s. Obolonsky, 2011, pp.61-193, Obolonsky, 2014, 
pp.145-170, etc). 
However, most of these steps were just technological half-measures and 
not capable of providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of public 
needs. This paper argues that the reason is that once again the reformers 
began from the obsolete, corporative bureaucratic view, based on the con-
viction that the administrative system might be reformed successfully just 
by means of internal technical improvements. That seems to be the wrong 
idea. An old French proverb says: “don’t ask the frogs to drain the swamp 
where they live”. This means, in the context of this topic, that to overcome 
the deficiencies of bureaucracy by means of creating new administrative 
bodies contradicts the very logic of genuine reform.1
Following this line of reasoning, there is also the question of whether 
the modern concepts of New Public Management and good governance 
suit post-communist East European countries. There are opposing views 
and some answers are negative. They presume that the so-called burden 
of mentality, the “curse of tradition”, or the “cultural code”, sometimes 
referred to as the “Moscow matrix”, the “Muscovite system” and so on, is 
an unchangeable factor and that societies are doomed to obey and bear 
this burden forever. This position is predicated on the presumption that 
autocracy is an inherent trait for some societies, which are “genetically” 
not suitable for democracy. It has had a long history and, unfortunately, 
is supposedly confirmed by many empirical cases. In recent literature it 
has been revived, in particular, by the American scholar E. Keenan (1986, 
1 This is in line with Laffon (2005, pp. 106,142) who remarked: “while the other 
European countries conduct rather radical public service reforms, France doesn’t hurry to 
join to them, restricting itself by the half-measures and still continues to be one of the last 
strongholds of centralization and bureaucratism, because the state sector consists of dino-
saurs who don’t wish to shake the former way of matters”.
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p.75).2 However, there are also different views, stating that tradition is not 
the only factor, although it is a very important one. Namely, the struggle 
against inferior and obsolete traditions and the efforts to overcome them 
are essential to progress. The history of the 20th century offers many re-
markable examples for this. 
Certainly, it is not easy for societies like Russia and other parts of the dis-
solved Soviet Empire. These societies are starting from a lower point com-
pared to more fortunate societies, which means it is more difficult to reach 
a “new horizon”. However, it seems that a successful transformation of the 
wrong traditional model of governance into a modern one is the only re-
liable way for all post-Soviet countries to avoid the threat of being trans-
formed into fully-fledged bureaucratic states, bureaucratic forms of reign 
with all the inevitable consequences: the uncontrollable growth of the size 
and influence of an irresponsible bureaucracy, its low effectiveness, flour-
ishing corruption, a revival of the nomenclature system, and the like.
1.2. Dependence of Corruption and Public Trust in 
Different Societies
There is a rather popular but seemingly doubtful assumption that corrup-
tion in transitional countries is radically different in comparison with cor-
ruption in developed ones. First, a high level of corruption in the former 
is supposedly inevitable. Second, people allegedly think that corruption 
is an essential and unavoidable part of the so-called “national mentality”. 
Third, it is even thought to be a certain positive and progressive factor at 
the transitional stage. These points will be briefly considered below.
For the proponents of the first point, the level of corruption and level of 
trust have a clear negative correlation: less trust equals greater corruption, 
while greater trust equals less corruption. For example, within the frame-
work of new institutionalism and Public Choice Theory, the negative ef-
fect of corruption on economic development is considered in terms of 
transaction costs, the rent-seeking behaviour of bureaucracy, the prison-
er’s dilemma, and so on. One of the empirical arguments is that the rise of 
trust in government by just 1%, brings about the growth of GDP per cap-
ita by as much as $660 in five years’ time. Francis Fukuyama considered 
2 S. also papers presented at the international conference “Rossia 1917-2017. Ev-
ropeyskaya modernizatsia ili osobyj put’? - The 17th Leontievskie Chteniy in St-Petersburg 
in the winter of 2017.
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social distrust to be an additional tax imposed on all national economies 
(Fukuyama, 1995, p.65). A possible reservation in this context could be 
that whilst this is correct in general, it does not hold true for all countries: 
in totalitarian and post-totalitarian states the situation is more ambigu-
ous. A mistrust of bosses and their orders may, in some circumstances, 
serve as self-defence and save human lives.
The second claim is developed as a result of a so-called “revisionist” 
approach. Scholars such as S. Lipset (Lipset & Schneider, 1987), S. 
Rose-Ackerman (1999), and others did not consider corruption to be 
pathological or a deviation from the norm, but believed it to be a kind 
of perverted norm, supposedly inherent in transitional societies as an es-
sential way of exchanging resources in societies where modernisation has 
been delayed. Some authors like S. Kordonsky, for example, even intro-
duced the special notion of administrative rent to describe corruption as 
the supposedly appropriate mechanism for the regulation of relationships 
between state institutions and business (Kordonsky, 2012, 2016).. In oth-
er words, this is a kind of institutionalisation, a legitimation of corruptive 
relationships. Supporters of this approach treat corruption as an inevita-
ble consequence of a specific form of the state–society relationship: not 
as a principal–agent model but as a patron–client model. Unfortunately, 
it has acquired some popularity in certain circles. 
It would not be difficult to find several relevant empirical examples in favour 
of this point of view. Unfortunately, in post-socialist states of Eastern Eu-
rope both the authorities and public opinion are inclined to treat corruption 
in a conciliatory way, as an inevitable evil and an appropriate mechanism to 
facilitate business development. However, to use the widespread existence 
of something wrong and unlawful as an argument for the legitimation of 
obviously negative practices like corruption seems incorrect and dangerous. 
This is a step from the position of analyst to the position of apologist for 
an existing, but definitely defective, administrative and political order. To 
continue with similar false logic, any crimes could then be justified, includ-
ing genocide, deportation, concentration camps, and so on. Therefore, to 
consider corruption an appropriate and not a criminal form of behaviour 
sounds like partial justification of everything initiated by the state.
1.3. Object of Trust as a Critical Point 
To understand the paradox of the positive role of public distrust, the cru-
cial question is: who is the object of trust? For example, trust in a business 
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partner is a positive thing. The same can be said of trust in democracy, 
the rule of law, social justice, some good public institutions, the integrity 
of officials, and the honesty of most people. But trust in a corrupt state, in 
crooked bureaucrats, or in a predatory government? Why? The answer de-
pends on the object of the supposed trust or distrust. On the other hand, 
this paternalistic form of trust correlates closely with the recognition of 
one’s own inability to make any positive differences in the public life of 
society. In the terminology of K. Popper (1945), it looks like a destructive 
attitude undermining the chances to create an open society, or a society 
of open access, in the categories of D. North (North, 1991). 
So, the progressive, positive role of distrust when it comes to “bad”, or 
corrupt, politicians and other officials should be emphasised. It is dis-
trust that triggers the making of a difference; in particular, the removal 
of corrupt individuals from government. For example, it was distrust that 
made the crucial contribution to the creation of American society. Let us 
remember who the first waves of immigrants from Europe were composed 
of. These were people who had ceased to trust their old governments. 
They had fled their native countries and taken enormous personal risks in 
an effort to find a place to build a new way of life on the basis of self-gov-
ernment, and to make a new start. Another, more recent, example may be 
the Maidan phenomenon in Ukraine. Despite all the differences, psycho-
logically there was a similar source of motivation. 
In contemporary Russia betrayed trust may be observed. During pere-
stroika, people had made a clear and strong social appeal for democracy, 
for the dismissal of corrupt officials at all levels, and so on. They believed 
in new faces with democratic manners and rhetoric. Unfortunately, this 
trust contained a sizeable dose of naive idealism. It was cynically exploited 
and betrayed by the newly rich and their administrative “servants”. Surely, 
a gap between high expectations and severe reality and accompanying 
public disappointment is inevitable, especially in periods of transition. 
Reality always differs from romantic hopes and beliefs. However, in the 
Russian case the size of the gap and scale of the disappointment proved to 
be too large, and the price paid for this was the loss of trust in democratic 
institutions as such, and in social justice overall – particularly in the pos-
sibility of honest governance. A negative consequence to arise from this 
was the emergence and development of Putin’s autocratic state regime 
and the terrible growth of systemic corruption.
The phenomenon of trust is therefore ambiguous and should be considered 
differently, depending on its form and object. Unconditional, personalised 
trust in monarchs, national leaders, presidents, and so on, is an archaic, pa-
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ternalistic form of trust. The very idea of constitutional rule developed from 
the basis of the philosophy and culture of distrust. The ideology of limited, 
informed, and controlled trust is a substantial part of democracy. Ironically, 
this is expressed well in the Russian proverb “Trust, but verify”, memorised 
by US President Reagan during his negotiations with Gorbachev.
Finally, trust between public officials and citizens must be reciprocal. The 
obligations of all parties to the relationship should be mutual. On the one 
hand, there are citizens, businesses, or NGOs, while on the other hand 
there is the state, represented by public officials. Only in this case does 
trust deserve to be considered a positive factor. Practical forms of trust 
can be different. It might be informal, based on custom or consensus, 
like in medieval societies, or it might be formalised in the constitution or 
other constitutional acts, like in Western countries. In any case, it should 
be based on a kind of “covenant”, or public agreement. The key words in 
this context are solidarity and voluntary cooperation. 
3. The Case of Russia3
Turning to Russia’s attempts to reform its bureaucracy, it should be em-
phasised that this experience, in general, was unsuccessful and even dis-
couraging. However, it deserves to be studied carefully because it reflects 
some common traits of post-communist specifics and is part of a more 
general issue: why is it so difficult to reform a bureaucratic state in transitional 
countries? The Russian example therefore seems quite interesting from a 
comparative perspective. 
Despite all the diversity of East European countries (a similar heritage, 
single-party governance, and totalitarian regimes) similar problems arose 
and have posed common obstacles to conducting reforms. In particular, 
these are: 
a) In all socialist countries middle-ranking bureaucrats were mainly just 
“cogs” or “driving belts” of the ruling party
b) To all intents and purposes, the merit system did not exist and a 
degenerate version of patronage in the form of a party-nomenclature 
system prevailed instead
3 Several parts of this section represent the author’s reflections originally published 
in a Russian-language textbook (Obolonsky, 2009, pp. 259-298) and English book chapter 
(Obolonsky, 2009a, pp. 301-316). However, the author finds it reasonable to retell these 
reflections and develop some of them further in abridged and modernised form.
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c) The public service did not exist either, in its genuine sense, because it 
is incompatible with autocratic rule.
After the fall of communism, some post-socialist countries made certain 
efforts to create a genuine public service, with varying results. However, it 
would be hard to name a completely successful example of public service 
reform in this part of the world. Moreover, variations of the bureaucratic 
state emerged in many countries, including Russia. It seems remarkable 
that even the name of Russian officialdom emphasises the word “state”, 
not “public”.
Since 1991 Russia has had a minimum of five attempts at reform, with 
very modest actual achievements. The essence of all these attempts was a 
hidden but persistent struggle between two incompatible paradigms, or a 
competition between two opposing approaches. The first approach cham-
pions a kind of pseudo-reform with a minimum number of practical steps 
towards a true public service and a step backwards in institutionalising 
and protecting the privileged status of the bureaucratic corporation. The 
second approach seeks to carry out a real modernisation of the adminis-
tration in accordance with the demands of the contemporary age and the 
challenges of truly democratic development. 
The first model rests on the traditional idea of the “ruler’s service,” (go-
sudareva sluzhba in Russian). Neither during the tsarist period nor the 
Soviet one had the patrimonial model of administration been oriented 
towards serving the needs of the people. Instead, it was mostly oriented 
towards looking after the needs of the ruler (“master”, as Stalin was un-
officially named), regardless of his formal title. This was the case even 
when the leader’s role was not embodied in one person but in a group, for 
example, during more recent periods of Soviet history when the Politburo 
was the collective leader of the country. The second model, which would 
be a novelty for Russia, would be a civil or public service, (grazhdanskaya 
or publichnaya sluzhba in Russian), whose first priority it is to serve the 
needs of the citizens. 
3.1.  First Round (1991–1995) 
In spite of the dramatic announcements of early reformers that a new state 
administration would be created from scratch, Russian post-communist bu-
reaucracy was very much the successor of the Soviet “administrative-com-
mand system” both in personal and administrative aspects. As a result, 
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the same persons whose entire careers had been spent in the role of the 
“transmission belts” for Communist Party policies, found themselves in the 
position of implementing the opposing post-communist politics of liberal 
reform. This exorbitant personnell continuity, combined with the complete lack 
of any steps in the direction of lustration became some of the crucial obstacles to 
successful transition. It marks a crucial difference between transition in Rus-
sia and in other post-communist East European countries. Moreover, the 
intellectual level and the lack of awareness of personal social responsibility 
for their actions (or inaction) – despite several exceptions – obviously did 
not match the duties and tasks that needed to be performed.
In a formal sense, the reform process started on November 28, 1991, 
when President Yeltsin signed a decree that established the Main Depart-
ment for the Training of State Officials, as part of the Russian Govern-
ment. The functions of this agency were considerably broader, however, 
than the name suggests. That was evident in the department’s acronym, 
Roskadry (Russian personnel). However, the main problem – what kind 
of administration was needed for the new Russia – had not even been 
seriously formulated then.
Instead, a completely different set of issues proved to be at the top of 
agenda. Besides the habitual question of who would “call the tune” within 
the state administration, the main focus centred on the struggle for the 
control over the prominent and lucrative part of the communist inher-
itance, the system of higher party schools, at the head of which stood the 
Academy of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, which for decades 
had served as a “crucible of personnel” for the higher ranks of the party 
apparatus (Huskey, 2004). The actors of this struggle were two types of 
educational institutions – the higher party schools and the newly-emerg-
ing departments of public administration at universities and research in-
stitutes. Eventually, the “heirs of the party”, headed mostly by the same 
old-style communist bosses, emerged victorious. 
This outcome had serious negative consequences because party school 
personnel held very negative attitudes concerning “the new times”. This 
was not surprising because they had all been carefully selected during 
Communist Party rule on the basis of their ideological loyalty and the 
ability to serve as defenders of the policy of totalitarian government. At 
the beginning of the 1990s these schools were staffed by personnel who 
held overtly revanchist attitudes towards liberal market institutions and 
freedom in general. 
However, despite their retrograde character, they managed to receive the 
lion’s share of budget allocations for the retraining of state personnel. 
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Moreover, the chief successor of the old party’s personnel retraining pool, 
the Russian Academy of State Service (RAGS), became the main con-
sultant to the president in the reorganisation of state service. It is also 
remarkable that when RAGS looked for external advice, it reached out 
to representatives of the French administrative tradition, which, despite 
all its positive features, had been reluctant to embrace the New Public 
Management movement and other innovations of the time. Russia there-
fore armed itself with weapons from an obsolete arsenal (Suleiman, 2003, 
p. 38). As a result, the legislative changes that were made in this period 
contained little that was substantially new, and in some cases actually 
restored some archaic constructs from Russia’s distant past. 
An example of this was the restoration, in 1995, of a rigid grading sys-
tem within the Law on the Fundamentals of State Service of the Russian 
Federation. This meant that almost three centuries after its initial intro-
duction, Russia had revived and updated the Table of Ranks.4 It is bitter 
Kafkaesque irony that one of the first actions of the new, supposedly dem-
ocratic, Russian government, was the restoration of a special corporatist 
status of bureaucracy, and the elimination of what was one of the few 
real achievements of the revolutions of 1917. Progressive officials such 
as Mikhail Speransky, as well as almost all of the Russian monarchs of 
the 19th century had realised that the potential positives of the Table of 
Ranks had been exhausted, and only its negative effects were being en-
forced. Even in Western Europe, where service grades and ranking played 
a much more modest role than in Russia, they are currently gradually 
moving towards an inglorious end. The outstanding Russian linguist Y. 
Lotman (Lotman, 1994) called it “the mystical power of rank” (mistika 
china). Over a century ago, M. Saltykov-Shchedrin (1988, first publica-
tion 1869) remarked bitterly that out of all the achievements of Europe, 
Russia had borrowed only the division of people according to rank, which 
by that time Europe had already abandoned. 
While Russia was reintroducing an institution whose inadequacy had al-
ready been recognised in the 19th century, the real issues remained unre-
solved. One example was the failure to introduce new blood into the state 
administration. Until the late 1990s, the continuity of administrative offi-
cials inherited from the Soviet era remained at 60–70 per cent, and stood 
even higher in some agencies (Kryshtanovskaya, 1996, p. 6). Thus funda-
4 On the role of the status of rank in the history of Russian officialdom, s. Bennett 
(1980).
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mental policy reforms had been implemented by people who had spent 
their whole careers in an anti-market, administrative-command system. 
Although Roskadry was closed in 1994, this aspect of policy changed little 
until 1996. Overall, the general assessment of the first round is negative.
3.2.  Second Round (1997–1998)
The second round began on a much more promising note. In 1997, Pres-
ident Yeltsin issued a decree that created the Commission on State Re-
construction, later renamed the Commission on Administrative Reform, 
which was joined by leading academic experts in law and public admin-
istration, including the author of this article. One of the commission’s 
primary tasks was the elaboration of a conceptual model for the genuine 
modernisation of state administration and, for the first time in Russian 
history, the creation of a genuine public service instead of different mod-
ifications to the traditional “ruler service” – a public service that would 
work for the citizens, the taxpayers, rather than for political bosses. The 
primary concern was personnel rather than structural issues. We tried to 
combine Russian specifics with the latest experience of civil service re-
forms in leading Western countries, especially Anglo-Saxon ones. 
The concept was mainly completed by the fall of 1997 and formally en-
joyed political support at the highest level. In the spring of 1998, Pres-
ident Yeltsin even included its major points in his annual statement to 
the Parliament: the competitive hiring procedure; reducing the number 
of employees and hiring fewer but better paid, better qualified, and hon-
est personnel; a clear, formal statutory differentiation between political 
appointees and career bureaucrats; the monetisation of privileges; and 
the protection of qualified officials from administrative pressure and the 
caprices of their political superiors (Poslanie Federal’nomu Sobraniyu, 
1998).
Although the commission enjoyed the patronage of the president, some 
influential actors within the government and the presidential adminis-
tration opposed this concept and managed to block any practical steps 
towards its implementation by hidden bureaucratic combinations. The 
details are still not available. 
So, at first glance, the second round appeared to represent complete vic-
tory for the anti-reformist wing of the state bureaucracy. However, the 
results were not wholly negative. First, it became obvious that the second 
round had laid a theoretical groundwork for reform and demonstrated 
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the absence of adequate alternatives. Second, the reformist ideas clearly 
formulated in this round entered the consciousness of the country’s polit-
ical-administrative elite to some degree and were developed among uni-
versity circles and students; i.e., by the next generation of state officials. 
3.3.  Third Round (1999–2000)
The autumn of 1999 brought a new but brief flurry of activity around re-
form, primarily stimulated by political circumstances. The political agen-
da was dominated by a struggle for Yeltsin’s legacy. In accordance with 
the age-old Russian tradition of seeking a scapegoat in troubled times, 
this role was assigned to bureaucrats. 
The most successful players at this game grew to be the pro-Putin party, 
Unity. A think-tank related to Unity, the Centre for Strategic Research, 
headed by the economist German Gref, prepared a substantial paper 
about condition of state service and the insistent need to reform it.5 Half 
of those who contributed to the paper were “the people of ‘97”, who pro-
vided a continuity of ideas and content. Besides some minor differences 
and a more detailed description of certain elements of the reform and 
practical steps towards seeing it through, the document contained some 
very harsh criticisms of bureaucracy. Reflecting the pre-electoral atmos-
phere, it argued that state administration in post-communist Russia re-
produced some of the worst features of Soviet officialdom, especially its 
corporatism, or caste-like character. The main focus of the criticism was 
the huge increase in administrative organisations and personnel, and par-
ticularly the enormous network of the federal ministries’ annexes in the 
provinces. In some regions, federal employees outnumbered their region-
al colleagues by a stunning ratio of ten to one.6 
On the whole, that document was a more pragmatic version of the pro-
gram of 1997. Unfortunately, it never produced any practical results. Af-
ter the elections of 1999 and 2000, interest in the reform dissipated and 
other issues took its place on the political agenda. As a result, the third 
round of reform shared the fate of its predecessors. 
5 For a discussion of Gref’s proposals, see Reforma gosudarstvennogo upravleniya v 
Rossii (www.parreform.ru/bulletin/), a website maintained by the World Bank.
6 Chislennost’ rabotnikov organov gosudarstvennoy vlasti i mestnogo samoupravleni-
ya po sub’ektam Rossiyskoi Federatsii na konets 2000 goda.
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3.4.  Fourth Round (2001–2002)
However, the pressing need to do something about the growing prob-
lems in the Russian administration determined the following, fourth, 
round. In the fall of 2001 a new reform commission was established. It 
was composed of high-ranking officials and headed by the Prime Min-
ister, M. Kasyanov. The responsibility for the practical introduction of 
reform proposals was assigned to several parallel groups operating within 
the presidential bureaucracy, the Duma, and the Ministry of Economic 
Development, headed by G. Gref. In contrast with the Yeltsin era, these 
groups operated in the spirit of Soviet organisations, secretly and outside 
of public scrutiny, which initially gave rise to suspicions regarding the true 
political priorities of the supposed reformers. 
It seems important to note that “the red line” dividing the supporters 
and opponents of reform, i.e., the proponents of progressive as opposed 
to conservative models of change, did not follow strict ministerial or de-
partmental borders. The situation was and still is more complicated and 
fluid. It would therefore not be appropriate to associate friends or foes of 
reform with particular administrative or political bodies. This is a specific 
issue, and a four-level sociological typology of pro-reformers and coun-
ter-reformers was eventually established, subdividing them into pragmat-
ic, ideological, and psychological types at each level (Obolonsky, 2009)
3.5. Fifth Round (2002–2012)
At first glance, the fifth round had once again started on an encouraging 
note. The Federal Program for the Reform of State Service, 2003–2005 
was published on November 19, 2002. It contained statistical data on 
the growth of Russian officialdom in the post-communist era, analytical 
anti-bureaucratic critiques, the main priorities of the reform, a list of the 
measures that needed to be taken and their detailed schedule with regard 
to particular executive agencies, the budget for each of the steps, and fi-
nally, a list of presidential and government sub-laws and other normative 
acts needed. 
The analysis offered by the Federal Program was critical and almost alarm-
ing. In a certain sense, it revived the “spirit of ‘97”, i.e., the second and 
most advanced round of reform. On the other hand, it reflected a com-
promise with the advocates of pseudo or “virtual reform” – in particular, 
the desire to protect the machinery of the state from external and public 
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control and scrutiny. However, despite all its inconsistencies, the program 
as a whole opened up an opportunity for making serious progress in trans-
forming Russia’s traditional model of “ruler’s service” into civil service.
Nevertheless, once again the declarations of the program did not corre-
spond with the practical steps that followed. A spirit of bureaucratic iner-
tia and hidden resistance prevailed once more. I suspect that the decisive 
choice between democratic and technocratic approaches to governance, 
a choice in favour of bureaucratic technocracy and full administrative ver-
tical obedience, was made at the top of the political heap at the time. The 
Chodorkovsky trial was a major political indicator, and the fate of the 
draft law “On Civilian State Service” proved to be a part of this choice. 
This law was considered crucial by reform proponents, but the exorbitant 
compromises made between pro- and counter-reformers during the revi-
sion stage deprived it of its crucial elements and, to an extent, its essence. 
For example, the introduction of an equalising scale for military and ci-
vilian ranks opened up the way for the mass transition of high-ranking 
military and security officers to positions in the civilian administration, 
regardless of their qualification for such jobs. This and other elements 
of the draft law were the subject of serious criticism during preliminary 
parliamentary hearings in the spring of 2003. In particular, some depu-
ties noted that the law in its current form would serve corporate interests 
more than those of the public. But the draft passed through the formal 
reading without serious discussion or amendments. It was the last session 
of the Duma before the December 2003 elections, and the deputies were 
completely focused on their re-election concerns. The final version of the 
law was adopted on 7 July, 2004 7 by the next Duma, when the single-par-
ty dominance of United Russia made any serious revisions to the text 
impossible. As a result, all the criticism expressed earlier was lost. 
By the summer of 2007, this round, which had started with such promise, 
came to a disgraceful end. The work continued in a formal sense. The 
president had signed most of decrees set out by the reform program. Their 
purpose was to improve performance assessment (attestatsiya), create re-
serve lists of personnel targeted for promotion (kadrovyi rezerv), establish a 
commission to handle disciplinary and ethical complaints against officials, 
and introduce competitive hiring.
7 Deputies from the Union of Right Forces must share some responsibility for this. 
Their criticism of the bill simply meant to score political points instead of taking real and 
positive steps towards improving the bill, which is the essential duty of responsible lawmak-
ers.
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However, it was difficult to find any substantive changes to the style and 
nature of how the bureaucracy operated. Instead, we faced an almost ex-
plosive growth in the number of bureaucrats, exceeding 1.5 million per-
sons at the time, and the rise of their ambitions as the supposedly “new 
class” to rule the country. 
Even small positive steps looked more like a fulfilment of a formal duty to 
do at least something in the style of “wiping the slate clean” (ochistit’ bum-
agu), to use an old, cynical, bureaucratic expression, rather than a desire 
to advance reform. Moreover, in the draft of the next reform program for 
2008–2012 even the word “reform” had initially been excluded in favour 
of the more flexible, but less meaningful and binding term “development”. 
Fortunately, this draft became the subject of serious criticism at a confer-
ence held at the Higher School of Economics, and the word “reform” was 
restored. However, this very fact seems a clear indication that the struggle 
for true reform of the state bureaucracy had reached its infamous end. 
If we return to the boxing metaphor, the end of the fifth round seems a pale 
imitation of the process in which a fighter has lost their will to compete and 
is merely awaiting the bell or the signal of the referee. The subject of the re-
form has been forgotten since then. The following political events and eco-
nomic crisis made the prospects of reform quite uncertain, if not hopeless, 
at least in the current circumstances and under current political leadership.
3.6. The Reasons for the Failure of Reforms
The particular reasons for the failure of reforms were different at each 
stage of the transition. In the period 1991–1996, the political situation in 
Russia was highly unstable and the dangers of the restoration of commu-
nist rule, including a violent revenge scenario, were quite real. In addition, 
the adverse economic situation in the country made any steps directed 
against the current administrative machinery more risky. It was a time of 
bitter ideological debate over the future direction in which the country 
should develop, and the government might have been afraid of creating 
another enemy inside the system. Therefore, in this period the advance-
ment of the reform process faced mainly political obstacles.
If we consider the 1990s a time of an incomplete anti-communist revo-
lution (which is the dominant approach in liberal circles in Russia), then 
among the reasons for the absence of a serious transformation in this peri-
od was the risk of unleashing yet another reform in such a fragile political 
environment and on such a weak state.
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But this fear of some decision makers was exaggerated and unreasonable. 
At that time, the negative feelings of citizens towards bureaucratic no-
menclature and the communist legacy in general were still strong enough, 
and the leadership might have received a popular mandate for public ser-
vice reform without a problem. Indeed, it seems that to have mobilised 
public support for anti-bureaucratic actions would have been easier than 
for anything else. And bureaucracy at that time was disoriented and weak-
en because it was loosing its habitual identity. In such disintegrated con-
dition it hardly was capable for any serious resistance to possible reform. 
The aversion to political risk was not the only complicating factor. Another 
reason was an underestimation of the critical importance of this kind of 
reform for general success. Russia’s leaders of the period did not consider 
the transformation of the civil service to be an issue of primary significance.
Although Boris Yeltsin and his team made some efforts to reject the Soviet 
and communist legacy after the putsch of August 1991, many people in the 
nomenclature retained their positions and used any available instrument 
to resist the so-called “de-communisation”. As a result, the new political 
order inherited almost the same executive apparatus. It is not surprising 
that, after they had recovered from the initial scare at the end of the 1980s 
and a few subsequent years, the old nomenclature, at first cautiously but 
then more aggressively, began to carry out a “quiet revanche”, blocking or 
undermining whenever possible the reformist policies adopted by the po-
litical leadership.8 The former nomenclature even managed to expand their 
status by means of “transforming power into property.”9
Russia is not unique in this respect. Practically all post-communist coun-
tries faced a certain degree of public disappointment when high expecta-
tions of quick and positive results of changes had not been satisfied. How-
ever, despite all these difficulties, the 1990s brought a lot of progressive 
changes and actually saved the country from a catastrophic “Zimbabwe 
style” collapse. Russian citizens have reasons to feel proud of the final 
decade of the 20th century, as opposed to what followed – the Putin era. 
Along with a certain amount of progress, some new barriers to reform 
have emerged during Putin’s presidency. First, it was the absence of open-
8 The opponents of reform within the bureaucracy cooperated frequently, though 
mostly covertly, in resisting reform. Their resistance included criminal and semi-criminal 
elements, who had definitely no interest in achieving a more professional, transparent, and 
honest officialdom.
9 This phrase originates from Egor Gaidar.
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ness, or glasnost’, regarding all the reform plans and processes. One of 
the most serious obstacles to conducting reforms is a closed, semi-secret 
manner of operating. Because bureaucratic reform presumes a fundamen-
tal change in the relationship between state and society, it also presumes 
the support and approval of the citizens. However, this is not possible 
without public knowledge and understanding of the proposed changes. 
The intentions and plans of the reformers must be clearly explained to the 
citizens, who might then be able to make their own suggestions by way of 
feedback. If citizens feel this kind of partnership with the reformers and 
trust them, they could offer some fresh ideas and provide the necessary 
political counterweight to the anti-reformist forces within the bureau-
cracy. Moreover, a civil society mobilising around reform will force the 
bureaucracy to be more accountable and transparent before the public. 
Particularly, among the many groups in society that have an incentive to 
support reforms, there are small and medium-sized businesses, who have 
suffered the abuse of corrupt officials. The inability, or unwillingness, of 
politicians to mobilise society around reform projects seems to at least 
partly explain not only the failure of their reform projects, but also the 
growing public alienation from the political process in general.
I believe there is no reason to fear public incompetence or destructive 
negativism. In fact, public discussion of reform projects is capable of en-
riching their positive content and making allies out of citizens. It is also 
better to get the inevitable, and possibly harsh, public criticism before a 
law is adopted, while there is still a chance to revise it, rather than to try 
and convince people of the value of the reform after the fact. As the his-
torian V.O. Kluchevsky noted long ago, a perpetual obstacle in the way of 
reforms in Russia is “the deep-seated indifference and distrust with which 
people meet any new appeal coming from the government because they 
know from experience that nothing good may come of it but new burdens 
and incomprehensible directives” (Kluchevsky, 1958, p. 87). 
Whether in Russia, in the United States or elsewhere, the experience of 
both successful and unsuccessful attempts to reform bureaucracy illus-
trates that it is vital for success to acquire allies both within officialdom 
itself and within society. Officialdom is, after all, heterogeneous, and also 
harbours proponents of progressive changes. Yes, it would be naive to 
assume that even the most forward-looking officials are able to elaborate 
comprehensive programs for changes that might be comparable in value 
with programs prepared by groups of experts, who have the time and 
knowledge to do so. However, what is needed from state officials is some-
thing different: those who recognise the necessity of reform and agree 
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with the general course it should take, could provide active support. I can 
testify from personal experience of extensive contacts with Russian offi-
cials that there are significant numbers of potentially reformist-minded 
people at different levels of government, and many can become effective 
allies, and even protagonists, of reform. Besides, this might improve the 
negative perception of bureaucrats in the public mind to a certain degree. 
To achieve a breakthrough, political leadership must promote an open di-
alogue on all acute issues of concern to state and society, and stop setting 
one against the other. The fear of “colour revolutions”, which may unfor-
tunately be observed in the mood and actions of our “political elite”, is a 
dangerous political pathology, on the brink of insanity. Only positive and 
clear political will in combination with public support and administrative 
consistency can make a success of the reformist movements.
4.  A Few Concluding Remarks from the  
Russian “Shore”
The huge growth in the size and influence of a patrimonial, highly corrupt, 
self-sufficient, and irresponsible bureaucracy is a particular consequence 
of not conducting substantial personnel changes in the state apparatus 
and the absence of vetting it in order to purge it of former high-ranking 
Soviet “bureaucrats” and KGB officers. 
a) The most malignant foes of further reforms are not the people who 
failed during the first stages of changes but the “early-winners”; i.e., 
those who managed to acquire gains in the “Klondike times” of the 
90s and are eager to save their current privileged positions. 
b) The so-called “administrative resource” is the worst and most dan-
gerous bureaucratic mechanism for abuses of power; it can only be 
successfully fought against under conditions of public control and a 
truly independent judicial system.
The state itself is a major violator of the law in contemporary Russia. 
Therefore, a certain mistrust of the authorities, contrary to customary 
views, holds substantial cultural and human potential for conducting 
modernisation policies successfully.
The general conclusion is that the current crisis cannot be successfully 
resolved within the framework of any administrative paradigm, by means 
of purely technological and/or social engineering improvements. The sit-
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uation needs to be revisited in a broader political and cultural context. 
The new age demands new approaches to the principles and mechanisms 
of governance. However, most officials and experts still prefer to rely on 
old concepts and techniques inherited from the previous political era. A 
bureaucracy is by definition a rather inertial construct. This trait has had 
more positive than negative consequences for centuries, but the current 
situation is radically different in many respects. Old approaches do not 
work effectively and we are dramatically entering a new world with many 
challenges, uncertainties, dangers, and opportunities. And unless bureau-
cracy is capable of finding sufficient wisdom and willpower to exact radi-
cal change (to meet new needs and aspirations, intersect with civil society 
at some points, and the like), many collisions and conflicts, some of them 
radical, may be expected under the pressure of advancing citizenry and 
street protests. Russia seems to be one of the most vulnerable points on 
the map of Eastern Europe in this respect.
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THE CRISIS OF THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE  
AND THE FAILED ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME IT  
IN THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC SERVICE
Summary
The paper integrates several theoretical and practical issues into the general 
context of the contemporary crisis of the bureaucratic state and a quest for new 
patterns of governance. Several subjects are considered: various aspects of the 
decline of public trust in government, including the civic “desacralisation” of the 
state, the paradox of the positive influence of social distrust on political devel-
opment, and the dependence between trust and corruption. Noting the serious 
efforts undertaken in several leading countries during the last 30 years in order 
to overcome this crisis, and the recent changes in their public management as a 
kind of administrative response to the situation, the author concludes that most 
of these steps, because of their purely technological character, did not pose a real 
alternative and could not solve the problems in accordance with current public 
needs and expectations. The main part of the article is devoted to the case of 
Russia – a description and analysis of five rounds of unsuccessful efforts to create 
a genuine public service in post-Soviet Russia and an analysis of the reasons 
for failure. Despite some partial improvements, the general results are judged 
to be a dramatic failure, causing the appearance of fully-fledged bureaucratic 
state with all the inevitable negative consequences. The most malignant foes of 
reforms in Russia are not the people who failed during the first stages of changes 
but the “early-winners”; i.e., those who managed to acquire gains in the 90s 
and have tried to save their current privileged positions by any means, including 
the so-called “administrative resource” and other abuses of power. The Russian 
experience also seems quite interesting compared with all other post-socialist 
East European countries. The common denominator of the author’s approach 
is an appraisal of the current condition of bureaucratic state institutions and 
personnel as unsuited to contemporary public expectations and demands, and 
a vital need to make them much more responsive and cooperative. Namely, it 
seems obvious that a new world is opening up with respect to the place and role 
of executive public officials.
Keywords: governance, public service reforms, public trust, Russia.
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KRIZA BIROKRATSKE DRŽAVE I NEUSPJEŠNI POKUŠAJI 
RJEŠAVANJA KRIZE U RUSKOJ JAVNOJ SLUŽBI 
Sažetak
U radu se isprepleće nekoliko teorijskih i praktičnih pitanja, a sve unutar šire-
ga konteksta suvremene krize birokratske države i potrage za novim obrasci-
ma upravljanja. Razmatra se nekoliko tema: različiti aspekti pada povjerenja 
javnosti u državu, uključujući građansku »desakralizaciju“ države, paradoks 
pozitivnog utjecaja nepovjerenja društva na politički razvoj, te povezanost pov-
jerenja i korupcije. Mnoge su države tijekom posljednjih 30 godina poduzele 
ozbiljne napore kako bi riješile krizu i na nedavne se promjene u njihovu javnom 
upravljanju može gledati kao na svojevrstan administrativni odgovor. No autor 
ipak zaključuje da većina tih promjena, s obzirom na to da su bile isključivo 
tehničke prirode, nije predstavljala stvarnu alternativu te one nisu mogle riješiti 
probleme u skladu s očekivanjima i potrebama suvremenog društva. Glavnina 
je rada posvećena slučaju Rusije. Opisuje se i analizira pet krugova neuspješnih 
pokušaja da se nakon raspada Sovjetskoga Saveza u Rusiju uvede javna služba 
u pravom smislu riječi. Usprkos djelomičnom napretku, pokušaji su rezultirali 
značajnim neuspjehom te je došlo do razvoja birokratske države i neizbježnih 
popratnih posljedica. Najveći neprijatelji reformi u Rusiji nisu oni koji su se 
susreli s neuspjehom u prvim fazama promjene, već su to »rani pobjednici“ – oni 
koji su 1990-ih stekli povlastice i potom ih nastojali zadržati na sve moguće 
načine, pa tako i zlouporabom moći. Ruska su iskustva također vrlo zanimljiva 
u usporedbi s iskustvima ostalih postsocijalističkih istočnoeuropskih zemalja. 
Autor ocjenjuje da sadašnje stanje birokratskih državnih institucija i njihovih 
zaposlenika ni u jednoj zemlji nije u skladu sa suvremenim očekivanjima i zaht-
jevima javnosti te drži da je potrebno znatno povećati razinu njihove odazivnos-
ti i suradnje. Očito je da se uloga javnih službenika mijenja iz temelja.
Ključne riječi: upravljanje, reforme javnih službi, povjerenje javnosti, Rusija

